Adam Robbert discusses the problem of the relation between “Harman’s object-oriented philosophy” and “the question of Science”. The solution seems to be: there is no relation at all, but if we “forget” the huge conceptual disparity between Harman’s and Latour’s philosophies then Latour can come to the aid of Harman. This is “aesthetic” surgery in a big way. The only quote he gives in support of this already very charitable reading of Harman is one from his book on Latour, PRINCE OF NETWORKS, where he enthuses over the superiority (both political and metaphysical) of Latour’s position to that of critical rationalism (typified by Socrates) and political engineering (typified by Callicles). He “enthuses” but he does not endorse, as this passage is expressed in Latourese and not in terms of Harman’s own philosophical vocabulary.
On this blog I have been giving a close analysis of a book (THE THIRD TABLE) where Harman talks about science in his own name, where he feels confident enough to contradict the Nobel prize-winning physicist Sir Arthur Eddington. He is right to do so, as I believe firmly in the necessity and utility of contributions by the ordinary citizen to debates between experts, on recondite subjects of all sorts, including that of the nature of reality, which can have an influence on the conduct of our lives. It is to be noted that Adam proceeds in the inverse direction importing an expert in science studies to supplement a notable lack in Harman’s philosophy. This salvific supplementation comes at the price of ignoring Harman’s own explicit pronouncements on science (such as the reiterated claim that the scientific object is “not real”, is an “utter sham” – no democracy here!) and also of ignoring the close reading that I have given here of THE THIRD TABLE.
What Adam Robbert does refer to, in my case, is my reconstruction of MEHDI BELHAJ KACEM’s general argument on post-badousian philosophy as applied to Harman. An argument that I translate and summarize, but that I also endorse, as my specific reading of THE THIRD TABLE confirms Kacem’s more general analysis. I think Adam gives a one-sided, or at least incomplete, presentation of Kacem’s (which is also my) thesis on Harman’s notion of the in-itself, and I would like to complete it here. Adam says:
“If—and it’s a big if—withdrawal necessitates an ontological relativism of all knowledge claims (a “flat epistemology,” to borrow a term from Terrence Blake) we would land in a shaky relativism, both in terms of the question of science and the development of knowledge in general. Clearly, this is not a desirable position to be in with regards to ethics, politics, and science. However, I think the answer to the question is, “No—withdrawal does not necessitate a flat epistemology.””
Kacem does not claim that Harman’s in-itself (not his concept of “withdrawal”, as the debate centers on degrees and types of withdrawal) necessitates relativism. He argues that Harman is caught in a two-pronged pragmatic contradiction, having to maintain both
1) the in-itself is unknowable, but OOO can nonetheless know something about it. Kacem argues that this thesis presupposes at an unconscious structural level a set theoretic type ontology, and thus the implicit primacy and historicity of science. (The primacy of set theory implies the historicity of science:”Copernicus then Galileo… reveal what will have been an in-itself previously inaccessible to human consciousness. This revelation itself of the in-itself will permit, three centuries later, the literalisation of the transfinite by Cantor”, Kacem, p134). Here Harman’s epistemology of science is vertical, enshrining, though unconsciously, the matheme as ultimate legitimation of the little that can be said philosophically.
2) the in-itself is knowable, but only by philosophical intellection and artistic allusion, all other truth-procedures, including science and politics, are relegated to the relativist status of equally illusory prehensions (this prong has as a consequence that there are no events in science that “reveal what will have been an in-itself previously inaccessible to human consciousness”, Kacem, p134, his italics. NB: this use by Kacem of the future perfect to denote a retroactive transformation of the status of unknowability of the in-itself, is central to his understanding of the science-event, but forbidden by Harman’s system). Here Harman’s epistemology of science is flat, demoting it to an instance of the general relativism of prehensions. However, by fiat, some artistic procedures are partially excluded from this relativisation. Here his more general epistemology is flat, but not smooth, as it contains some artistic lumps. But no criterion of demarcation is offered.
Kacem thinks that this dilemma can be resolved by fully accepting that the in-itself is only relatively unknowable, that withdrawal is relative. This is better than the incoherent pirouette of making the real object utterly withdraw from science, the humanities, and common sense (their objects are “utter shams”), and only partially withdraw from some philosophical and artistic practices. Harman wants to have his (withdrawn) table and eat (on) it too. So we are left with a mysterious phenomenon of degrees of withdrawal and of de-withdrawal.
Harman claims that “objects can never be caught” (THE THIRD TABLE,p12), the real object can never be “captured”. Kacem disagrees:
“the in-itself is as infinite as all the rest, and thus inexhaustible. But one cannot then decree it to be totally uncapturable, on the contrary: science does suppose this in-itself to be capturable, by definition, without which there would not be any scientific historicity, that is any historicity at all” (Kacem, p135).
He draws some interesting conclusions from this historicity of science. One of the most important is that one you acknowledge the historicity of science, once you realise that it is not a mere series of encounters with the real, once you accept that it is composed of mutations and radical conceptual reconfigurations, then you must accept what he calls an “anthropological singularisation”. More generally, he argues that the more “object-oriented” you are, the less you are able to think any singularity, whether it be that of humanity, animality, life or anything else.
The encounter of the cotton with the fire may resemble my encounter with the table, but all that is anecdote, as it cannot resemble our scientific encounter with an Earth that we now know to be round, and not flat as it was formerly thought. The transfusion of the Latourian notion of turning a heterogeneous collective into a “cosmos” will not help here, unless we accept the historicity of this cosmos (“from closed world to infinite universe”, for example):
“It does not really seem that the other animals know about the accretion of the Earth, the Neolithic, or the fact that the sky is not a vault nor is the archi-Earth flat, as we ourselves believed for such a long time” (Kacem, p137).
Hi Terrence (and continuing from our discussion at Knowledge Ecology),
I should have been more explicit that by invoking your term “flat epistemology” I was not trying to engage with your larger critiques of The Third Table (a book I have not read), nor with the larger discussion you draw from Kacem (which I also have not read). What I am interested in is the question of science and OOO because it’s one I backed into when thinking about what an object-oriented approach to ecology would look like. It seems there is some overlap between the larger discussion you have initiated in your last series of post and my interests, but acknowledging all of them was not my intent (nor one I am sufficiently educated on — having not read the material in question — to give any kind a good response to).
A few thoughts on where we do intersect, though:
I’m of the opinion that the sciences are very important in ecological research (there’s no need to state that, actually), and wanted to establish for myself whether or not OOO might plunge us in to another “science wars” pitting social constructivists against scientists (an unfortunate battle Latour was snagged in, as is well known). After exploring the issue for a few months, my conclusion is that OOO does not put us at such risk, and some of my thoughts in that regard are expressed in my “Ontology of Knowing” post.
As for the Latour – Harman suture, we have a difference of opinion here. I read Harman as very much compatibile with Latour, wherein Harman takes him (Latour) into explicitly metaphysical (i.e., philosophical) terrains that Latour has historically been uninterested in. In that sense, much political work has already been done by Latour, and Harman’s goal (as I read it) was in fact to excavate the ontological underpinnings of that work. Thus I take it that there is quite a bit of Latour’s work already active in OOO, and Harman’s work is centrally focused on ontology because others have been had at work on the politics for years. Of course, the work of politics is never done, but I think the move towards exploring ontology more deeply — a move initiated by Harman, in this context — has been a very worthwhile one for both philosophy in general, and politics in particular. What to make of that work should be up to individuals and groups working on specific problems in their respective fields.
Take it with a grain of salt though this is just my interpretation of the scenario, and shouldn’t be read as a factual account of what Harman and Latour actually interpret their relationship as.
No problem Adam. As it happens, I think that something like your Harman-Latour hybrid is the best way to go. This is particularly so as Feyerabend, who I think is undeservedly neglected – especially in his last phase, was going in this direction in “REALISM AND THE HISTORICITY OF KNOWLEDGE”, published originally as an article available from JSTOR:
http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/2026649?uid=3738016&uid=2129&uid=2&uid=70&uid=4&sid=21100842669881 (I don’t have access to JSTOR but maybe you do),
and later as a chapter in CONQUEST OF ABUNDANCE, p131-146.
I think that Latour helps us think the “historicity” but is not so good on the “realism”, and the reverse is the case with Harman. So I must insist that the “compatibility” between Harman and Latour is not a given to be explored, but a hybrid to be created. This hybridisation is more at the level of good intentions for the moment, given the notable divergences on relations, reductionism, and withdrawal. This should be soluble as I do not see Harman’s philosophy as a closed system, but I do think he painted himself into a corner in THE THIRD TABLE, and that this indicates that there is some conceptual revision to be done.
Consequently, I was only too happy to see Kacem highlight the tension between realism and historicity as a basic structural problem for the “post-badiousian” conceptual configuration, and include Harman in his analysis. I do not agree with all that he says, but I think that he is on to something here. Kacem, however, does not consider Latour, who would probably mess up his neat categories. So all this is an open field for me too.