A consequent philosophical pluralism has its own dynamic that leads from a pluralism inside philosophy (eg Feyerabend’s methodological pluralism), to a pluralising of philosophy itself as an ontological realm and a cognitive régime claiming completeness and universality (eg Feyerabend’s Machian “way of research” and his later ontological pluralism: the aim is to move beyond the academic idea of “philosophy as a discourse that covers everything … an all-encompassing synthetic view of the world and what it all means”.
Here I think comes the move of putting philosophy in relation to a non-philosophical outside (non-philosophical not meaning a classical negation but a wider practice, as in non-Euclidean geometries). Laruelle has written on this sort of thing at length, but he cannot claim exclusive ownership (nor even chronological priority) of this idea, nor is he even necessarily the best exemplar of the practice of such a non-philosophy.
At least Laruelle’s work is a gesture in the right direction. And so his name can have the operator “non-” applied to itself with as much justice as Laruelle applies it to philosophy. A non-laruellian non-philosophy is a reasonable prolongation of pluralism. Feyerabend, Bruno Latour, Bernard Stiegler, Deleuze and Guattari are good examples of such a non-laruellian non-philosophy.