CONTEMPORARY PLURALISM: Dreyfus and Kelly, Feyerabend, Rorty, Deleuze, Laruelle vs OOO

This is an attempt at synthesising various discussions of pluralist ideas:

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9 Responses to CONTEMPORARY PLURALISM: Dreyfus and Kelly, Feyerabend, Rorty, Deleuze, Laruelle vs OOO

  1. Jason Hills says:


    I’ll admit to skimming the essay, so perhaps I missed it … what are you claiming when you say that OOO has “no realism?” I ask because I had–quite awhile ago–long conversations with Bryant on realism. I was arguing for “scholastic realism” (via Peirce), whereas he was using the analytic tradition’s definition of “realism” that opposes it to “idealism” (what is ultimately real is the world, in which truth resides independently of mind, and not ideas). Of course, I accepted that as a minimal but incomplete requirement for any “robust” realism that claims more than the independent existence of the external world (per analytic parlance).

    So, what are you targetting when you claim that it is a “bad realism,” especially since you are engaging Harman?


  2. Jason Hills says:

    Sigh. I didn’t set the email notification for that last comment. Also, I find WordPress to make email notifications and tracking a conversation more difficult.


  3. terenceblake says:

    Hello Jason, as I explained I limit myself to Harman for my discussions of OOO as such. My critique of his “realism” is that he de-realises everything except his own fictitiously postulated “real” objects that are invisible, untouchable, uncapturable, unkowable. They are pure intellectual constructions or noumena of a system that denies them any of the attributes of reality that we are familiar with. Harman’s categories are just too crude to deal with common sense, let alone science. So his realism is empty and formulaic. Yet at the same time these empty slogans could be used to limit scientific research. A very amusing example for me was, as you may recall, Timothy Morton’s repeated claims that the Higgs Boson would never be found as it was “correlationist”. Imagine research funding being allocated on OOO terms. Relational and processual hypotheses would be excluded from the beginning. So in a very broadsense, but here I defer to you, my objection is pragmatic.


  4. dmfant says:

    I think that if we could flesh out, pardon the pun, Rorty’s take on individuation in his Contingency book and put it to work in various contexts via ANTish engineering we would be well on our ways…


    • Jason Hills says:

      The post displays the common terrible misinterpretation of Dewey’s Experience and Nature. Santayana just didn’t get Dewey, and many contemporary analytics do the same thing. Dewey didn’t mean by “naturalism” what most people back then–more so now–meant by the term. If one parses what he meant by the term, it makes far more sense. Finally, the invocation of the naturalistic fallacy (or the reverse) against Dewey is tired and also inappropriate. Once again, it shows a lack of understanding of what Dewey was doing. There is criticism to be had–in spades–but criticisms based on misreadings are not helpful.

      By the way, despite what he implies, Rorty is far from a scholar of classical pragmatism.


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