DELEUZE vs HARMAN: ON KINETIC AND DYNAMIC RELATIONS

Graham Harman has yet again published a version of his absurd and utterly refuted claim that an ontology of relation and event cannot explain change (p47). This ignores temporal relations such as relative speeds and accelerations, as well as relative forces.

Deleuze(SPINOZA: PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY, Deleuze, p123)

and

Deleuze 2(p124)

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3 commentaires pour DELEUZE vs HARMAN: ON KINETIC AND DYNAMIC RELATIONS

  1. Anon dit :

    Kinetic, dynamic, and temporal… So, in your most recent tumblr, you hold that Harman ignores these types of relations, yet I would anticipate him saying that he doesn’t (sensual qualities anyone?). You seem to say that a Harmiverse with discrete Harms needs relations of this type in order for it to account for change. I’m wondering if this critique is continuous with your larger critique of synchronic ontology or else a critique of Harman on his own terms. I appreciate your research method of collecting fragments of writings you have made in different fora into a central post later on, but sometimes it obscures the motivation behind specific arguments. The problem is that Harman’s gripe with relational ontology cannot be applied back to OOO in a non – question begging way

    J'aime

  2. terenceblake dit :

    I argue firstly that Harman’s master argument against philosophies of relation and event (that they are unable to account for or even to accomodate change) is invalid. It is an argument that he repeats in several places, including in the recently published article I link to above. I point out, as I have already on several occasions, that this argument gains its superficial plausibility by ignoring temporal relations. In this post I give a specific example of this general rebuttal by adducing Deleuze’s ontology with its plane of immanence composed of relations of movement and rest, of acceleration and deceleration (kinetic aspect) and relations of force and of capacities to affect and to be affected. This specific example is important too this argument because Harman claims to go beyond the deconstructive-type philosophies of the end of the 20th Century. I claim that not only is his argument invalid, but that Harman shows no sign of understanding the philosophies he is supposedly moving beyond. I do make a further critique: Harman has no place for the reality of temporal relations in his system, they belong to the sensual ie « sham » realm for him. These three strands invalid argument (in fact I think it is a very silly argument), ignorance and incomprehension of diachronic philosophers such as Deleuze, synchronic ontology and its corresponding demotion of time to non-reality, all form a convergent whole for me. Sometimes I concentrate on one strand sometimes on another. I am trying to assemble all my interventions in the hope of writing it all up into a book. I see no question-begging in showing the invalidity of Harman’s catchphrase (you can hardly dignify it with the title of argument) that if everything were related nothing would change. Nor in retorting that for him change is unreal.

    J'aime

  3. For what it’s worth, near the end of Harman’s Guerrilla Metaphysics, he mentions—almost as an aside—that something he calls « Black Noise » is the place within (or surrounding?) objects, where all potentiality and temporality reside. A big jump! He also talks about « accidents » as a kind of special straining device for objects, through which differing possibilities of relation pass. So perhaps « Black Noise » is where he would point to in order to answer your questions. But to be honest, it just seemed like another location where the study of « withdrawal » becomes a sort of mysticism, but instead of peering into a crystal ball, we get objects.

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