JTH at atheology has given a very fair and open-minded reply to my remarks on the battle for cognitive hegemony (originally a comment to his post on verificationism), expressing his reservations about Deleuze and Guattari’s narrative of the attempt to gain mastery by imposing one’s discipline as “the official language of a pure State”. I too am ambivalent about this primacy narrative, in the sense that in WHAT IS PHILOSOPHY? it still gives philosophy a meta-function of being able to form philosophical concepts based on the functions of science and the percepts of art. However, I think they come closest to undoing the primacy of philosophy, that for example Badiou still maintains. Another problem is that this narrative is demarcationist and excludes the transversality that they defended in earlier works. I do not worry about which of the candidates (ontology, physics, psychoanalysis, epistemology, linguistics, cognitive science etc.) for hegemony is right, as if we subtract the primacy claim and its reductionism they are all right in that each explains important aspects of the other, and must do so to be complete eg cognitive science must explain, without reduction, scientific cognition and not just error.
I think that Meillassoux’s use of “correlation” leads to a comic book version of the history of philosophy, and in the strict sense very few important philosophers of the last 100 years have been correlationist. They often consider something like correlationism and eliminate it as a mere preliminary to the serious work. Popper’s critique of the bucket theory of knowledge is a good example, as is Althusser’s critique of the “problematic of the subject” (and this is where the normalien Meillassoux probably got the concept, rebaptising it and advertising it as new). I try to give a more extended concept of correlation as a positvie overcoming of subjectalism in 4 posts taking off from Katerina Kolozova’s Laruellian analysis: https://terenceblake.wordpress.com/?s=kolozova. My antipathy about the use of the word “correlation” changed as a result of reading the excellent article by Katerina Kolozova on Laruelle’s non-marxism and on the need for monstrously radical concepts.
““Laruelle, let us note, uses the term “correlation” in a different sense – it is a relation which is not “relationist”, one that remains in the One, one that merely correlates with the Real without mirroring it, within the gesture of relative constitution of both terms. So Meillassoux’s “correlationism” corresponds to the non-philosophical notion of the relative mutual constitution of the Real and the Transcendental, i.e., of Philosophy’s Unity (of the Two) or auto-reflectivity” (p223, footnote 16).
Correlation in this extended sense would be totally compatible with transversality of research and gives “primacy” not to any discipline but under the name of “determination in the last instance” to the Real or to the “source of immanence”.