My post was meant as a response to the idea that the separation between scientific categories and transcendental principles is a necessary demarcation, needed to counter scientism, which conflates them into a simple identity. If one does not feel comfortable with this sort of binary opposition the question arises of their composition « how do you blend them? ». It is a notable feature of WHAT IS PHILOSOPHY? that it seems to abandon the rhetoric of transversality that pervades the previous collaborative books, in favour of a sober set of demarcations. Yet I think that the concept of « zones of indetermination » is a sort of replacement concept for this transversality, and would correspond to a notion of « blending » without fusion. Gregory Flaxman seems to argue along similar lines in his book GILLES DELEUZE AND THE FABULATION OF PHILOSOPHY. This passage from transversality to demarcation quite disturbed me at the time (1991) and it took some years to reconcile myself with WIP.
Deleuze, in DIALOGUES for example, seems to be very critical of « metaphor » and insists that terms such as « face » and « black hole » are not metaphors but deterritorialised expressions. This always used to trouble me and I think that it was due to the context of a polemic with lacanism. Outside that context I see no reason to refuse the word « metaphor » as long as we recognise that it must not be understood in terms of the binary opposition with mimesis. That way we can use the term respecting Deleuze’s concepts without necessarily buying into all his terminological choices.
I think Deleuze’s explicit rejection of metaphor (although for me his work is metaphorical through and through) is tied to his whole rejection of the signifier. The opposition then becomes Guattarian machinic vs Lacanian metaphoric. But a machinic sense of metaphor is possible (as you say in terms of transfer or trans-port) even if it does not occur in the texts. Then the opposition would be machinic metaphor vs signifying metaphor, and the difference between them would be that of pragmatics vs semantics or performance vs representation.
So the question becomes one of the possible relation between different consistences. Does this diversity of consistences (eg between philosophy and the sciences) imply a total incommensurability and thus the complete closure of a consistence on itself? Or can one affirm simultaneously that partial, local interferences are sometimes not only legitimate but also productive of important advances and breakthroughs?
Michel Filippi in response to this question makes use of the Laruellian concept of a « superposition » of that « can be explored separately and towards which one can hybridise ». He speculates that after this stage of diachronic hybridisation a subsequent stage of synchronic spatialisation can occur. This confirms my hypothesis that just as in the case of nature we may make the distinction natura naturans/natura naturata, in the case of science too we may distinguish scientia sciens (diachronic heuristic hybridising science in action) from scientia scita (synchronic, apodictic, demarcated results of science).
I like Michel Filippi’s analysis a lot because it affirms an important performative dimension to science in the making, that I call the context of participation (as opposed to both the context of discovery and the context of justification). Superposition can give rise to two different « treatments ». One leans towards an incommensurability of closure, hermetically sealed off from other paradigms and consistences, the other leans towards an incommensurability of encounter and exchage, which is porous enough to permit hybridisations without imposing them.