In his paper on Meillassoux, Justin Clemens talks about the inevitable contradictions of SR when it tries to step beyond the philosophically unacceptable procedure of developing its problematics on the basis of a self-validating dogmatic posit and engage in a philosophical dialogue requiring real argument instead of mere rhetorical gesticulation. I have been analysing Graham Harman’s version in a similar light, and have come to the conclusion that his dogmatic positing, argumentative inadequacy, conceptual confusion, and rhetorical obfuscation are of a piece with his starting point in the posit of an immaterial realm of real objects, removed from all qualification. Real objects are not material in either the common sense or the scientific acception of matter, both declared to be reductionist.  A stranger conclusion is that real objects are not quantifiable either. Despite starting out from a paradigm that finds its conscious formulation in Badiou’s set theoreticism, Harman has consistently adulterated this Badiousian subtention. All truth-procedures are declared to be reductionist and to produce ideological phantasms. In BELLS AND WHISTLES  Harman declares several times that explaining things in terms of mathematical structures is reductionist. So finally his real objects are neither qualitatively distinct (in terms of empirical predicates belonging to the phantasmatic realms of common sense, the humanities, the sciences, and even mathematics), nor are they numerically or quantitatively distinct (as mathematics is itself a reductionist phantasm). So Harman’s real realm is a de-qualified and de-quantified void.

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