THÈSES SUR L’ONTOLOGIE OBJECTUELLE (1): l’OOO est un demi-post-structuralisme

1) L’ontologie synchronique pose a priori les éléments réels du monde et la nature de leurs relations.

2 L’ontologie soustractive d’Alain Badiou et l’ontologie abstractive (“ontologie orientée vers l’objet” ou “OOO”) de Graham Harman sont des exemples d’ontologie synchronique.

3) L’ontologie objectuelle pose a priori que les éléments réels sont des objets, et que ces objets sont retirés de toute relation.

4) Un autre type d’ontologie existe qui ne décide pas en amont de toute expérience empirique du champ du réel: une ontologie diachronique ou non-philosophique.

5) On trouve des esquisses d’ontologie diachronique dans les œuvres de Gilles Deleuze, François Laruelle, Bernard Stiegler, et Bruno Latour.

6) L’enjeu philosophique contemporain c’est le choix entre une ontologie synchronique et une ontologie diachronique. Entre la nostalgie de la structure et la poursuite de la déconstruction. Entre Badiou/Harman et Deleuze/Laruelle/Stiegler/Latour.

7) L’ OOO se veut le successeur de la déconstruction et du post-structuralisme, mais elle en est le travestissement, une régression nostalgique.

8) Le “retour aux choses” annoncé par l’OOO est plutôt un retour aux abstractions transcendantes, un retour au platonisme.

9) Loin d’être une pensée du concretvet démocratique, l’OOO est un formalisme vide et éltiste.

10) L’OOO est coincée entre le structuralisme et le post-structuralisme, c’est un demi-post-structuralisme

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8 Responses to THÈSES SUR L’ONTOLOGIE OBJECTUELLE (1): l’OOO est un demi-post-structuralisme

    • prsmith5 says:

      I get the distinction Stiegler wants to make, but who approaches intersubjectivity while assuming the subject in advance? Here, I’m thinking of Habermas, who begins with the between or the lifeworld and speaks of subjectivity as always occurring or emerging from within that context–of course, he tends to limit himself to communication and language. It’s not a significant difference, but there seems to be something at stake in suggesting that individuation or transindividuation is speaking of something entirely removed from those who see themselves working in an intersubjective paradigm.

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      • dmf says:

        as he says he’s talking about Latour’s “flat” ontology

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      • prsmith5 says:

        Thanks dmf.
        Nonetheless, it seems a bit more complicated than that, as he moves from stating Latour gives us an “interobjectivity” that challenges intersubjectivity, to accepting the prognosis that intersubjective paradigms presuppose the subject exists before relations. So he agrees the move away from intersubjectivity, while finding the solutions of ANT insufficient.

        My question meant to suggest that this prognosis of intersubjectivity is a strawman (you could find an argument for it in the Phenomenology of Spirit, although it’s problematic to give Hegel the last word on intersubjectivity). Acknowledging that intersubjective approaches fail to take a good deal of the material world into account (the role of technologies, and other material scaffolding in forming individual and collective consciousness), I don’t think it can’t be reconciled with transindividuation.

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      • terenceblake says:

        Yes, I see no reason to think that a paradigm of intersubjectivity is obliged to presuppose a pre-constituted subject. If it gives primacy to the intersubjective field, it can describe subjectivity as being constituted secondarily. I think that the later Merleau-Ponty is a good example of this.

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      • dmf says:

        I think the matter is more how far down the path to Whitehead do we want to go (thanks to adam/knowledge-ecology for this link): http://www.shaviro.com/Blog/?p=1181

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  1. prsmith5 says:

    Apologies for ignoring the original post and focusing on dmf’s video. As to the cognition vs. thinking distinction, I think continental philosophy could benefit from some of the ways in which contemporary analytic philosophy has begun to distinguish capacities we intuitively refer to when using ‘thinking’ as a token. Taking the work of Clark, Chalmers, R. A. Wilson and others seriously would add subtlety to talk of both OOO and transindividuation.

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    • terenceblake says:

      Stiegler prefers the notion of the noetic, because of its greater generality, as it includes according to him both cognition and invention, or understanding and reason. But he emphasises that individuation involves the effectuation of a diversity of capacities, and so would not be hostile to their specification.

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