I have been trying to clarify the price Harman must pay for his advocacy of the strong withdrawal thesis. We have seen that if we follow through the basic tenets of Harman’s system we are obliged to conclude that objects withdraw from facts i.e. facts belong uniquely to the sensual realm, or more clearly: facts are illusions. One may now ask the further question: do real objects have properties or qualities?
Harman’s answer would seem to be “yes”, and he talks about the real as composed not just of objects, but also of qualities, properties, and relations. For example, in BELLS AND WHISTLES Harman declares (page 30):
Essence for object-oriented philosophy means nothing more than the tension between a real object and its real properties in a single instant
We must note that r
However, the concept of real properties is even more incoherent than that of real facts. All the properties that Harman’s system permits one to ascribe to real objects are generic, epistemic, and de-relational (i.e. full or partial synonyms of the property of “withdrawal”): real objects are invisible, untouchable, and unknowable.
the sort of essence defended here is absolutely not knowable
We may conclude that either Harman’s “real objects” can be alluded to, in which case they are intrathetic noumenal correlates of linguistic evocation and intellectual intuition, or they are totally withdrawn not just from the senses, but also from knowledge (see quote above), from the intellect, and from language. In both cases real objects have no real properties, except by arbitrary posit.