Bakker has replied to my challenge to finally state his theory. Replying to my previous post he solemnly declares:
“The theory, stated in its highest altitude form, is that we are natural in such a way that we cannot intuit ourselves as natural”.
This declaration contains two claims
1) we are natural (ontological naturalism)
2) we cannot intuit ourselves as natural (restricted metacognitive blindness)
These two claims do not constitute a theory, but are vague postulates associated with a supposed theory. (1) is very general, and banal. (2) is more specific, and false. (1) is an ontological hypothesis, not a scientific one. Indeed, as a metaphysical interpretative hypothesis it is not even necessary to the conduct of science (methodological naturalism is preferable) and it is certainly not imposed by the sciences. (2) is a naive epistemological hypothesis, which treats intuition as some a-conceptual reception of data.
It is to be noted that Bakker does not maintain the weak hypothesis: we do not in fact intuit ourselves as natural. This is demonstrably false for a large number of people in modern secular societies. He affirms the modally stronger impossibility thesis: we are unable to intuit ourselves as natural. Even if the weak or descriptive hypothesis were true (which it is not) it would take a lot more argument to back up the strong hypothesis of necessary blindness.
By way of comparison we can examine Paul Feyerabend’s theory. Feyerabend is one of the originators of the eliminativist hypothesis. He defended (1), naturalism. However, he never endorsed the assumption contained in (2). In fact he maintained the opposite of (2), i.e. that we can and often do intuit ourselves as natural.