1) Neo-pessimism is monism: the mono-tonal subjectivation of a passively received a-tonal world.
2) Neo-pessimism is not « cosmic » pessimism. Cosmic pessimism is a contradiction in terms: https://t.co/Rl9zcLT3Uu
3) Neo-pessimism is pseudo-scientism, it mobilises no real scientific knowledge of physics or biology just an antiquated « sciency » worldview.
4) Neo-pessimism is 50 identical shades of black.
5) Neo-pessimism has a continuist view of history, history without the event: there are no discontinuities, there are no ruptures.
6) For neo-pessimism, all history is non-history: history ended before it began.
7) Neo-pessimism is a-speculative realism. It has renounced speculation while retaining a nostalgic realism.
8) Neo-pessimism groups all the incommensurabilities of multiple worlds into one big mega-incommensurability, and so is a homogenising force.
9) Neo-pessimism finds the world « unthinkable ». This is what Wittgenstein called a philosophical cramp.
10) Neo-pessimism is no friend of Gaia, but of terra-forming. It remakes the Earth in its own image.
Terence, this is definitely not relevant to the Cioran specifically, but I was unsure where else to posit my queries. If you would have me pose these questions elsewhere, I would appreciate being re-directed.
Anyway, I was wondering how your ontological commitment to ‘pluralism and Individuation’ would not automatically commit you morally to a sort of Negative Average Preference Utilitarianism and therefore to sentiocentric pessimism/antinatalism, as discussed by this blogger:
If you feel such a challenge is preposterous in its pretentiousness then I would rephrase it thusly: not how it wouldn’t commit you, but how would you counter such an approach given that it can very well follow from said ontological commitment. This would no doubt seem strange at the get-go since most antinatalists seem heavily monistic (see: Cioran, Ligotti, Inmendeham on YouTube), but I’m sure you will be surpised as I was if you find yourself giving some time to invest in the moral issues involved.
I know moral philosophy isn’t per se your thing but you’re one of the few philosophers available online whose views I admire, so i would highly appreciate your input on this subject given that I’ve struggled with it for a fair amount of time now.
Thanks for your consideration.
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If all of this seems hogwash to you in any case then I would humble myself by reducing my statement to a mere curiosity as to why philosophy has hitherto focused so strongly on whether life is worth living while at the same time more or less completely neglecting whether it is worth perpetuating.
Terrence, it would also be interesting to know what you make of Extinctionism, an approach that would seemingly morally entail a sort of « palliative care for the species » (or, perhaps, for every species? this would connect it back to the aforementioned sentiocentric antinatalism), given your cursory rejection of metaphysical and moral pessimism.
Frame of reference: https://attemptsatliving.wordpress.com/2012/09/19/extinction-again/