The considerations brought up in the discussion at the DAILY NOUS of changing standards of philosophy to incorporate more, and deeper, diversity (here) involve both internal and external aspects (although this distinction itself is called into question by “diverse” philosophies).
1) Internal: we are talking at a great level of generality, although no doubt people have specific examples in mind. There is a sort of phenomenological epoche that we must effectuate, so that the examples are viewed solely in relation to the question of whether they can be regarded as philosophy or not. The question here is not whether we agree with the examples or find them to be good examples of philosophy, but only whether they are philosophy even though they stretch the entrenched standards of demarcation.
The relevant examples are ones which embody a sufficient amount of theoretical work, a sufficient conceptual level, sufficient argumentation (implicit or explicit), sufficient relation to acknowledged problems or problematics or texts or figures. I have proposed three criteria, not in the abstract, but to be mobilised when the question of “philosophy or not?” comes up in a specific instance. In each case I have qualified the criterion with the intentionally vague “sufficient”, which sufficiency can be rationally discussed and argued about, but not determined by some fixed and sharply-demarcated judgement.
2) External: there are “gatekeepers”, and they are not just “we philosophers” (of which I am a member) nor “we university philosophy teachers” (of which I am not currently a member, although I was once). The academics need to be persuaded or obliged to modify their standards, or may just drift into a modification that they perceive only afterwards.
There is a sociology of philosophy, whether we are aware of it or not, whether we like it or not. University philosophy teachers are paid a salary, and can be induced to modify their curriculum by financial or administrative means. Student interest, or pressure, can lead to changes. There are also other social forces. Four decades ago, the first course in feminist philosophy in my old university only got accepted, after much resistance, after a student strike backed up by the builders’ union going on strike too. The student strike alone was not enough. Nowadays such courses are a banality.
A third consideration is that the discussion is mostly on the “receiving” side, asking whether “we” should accept innovations that in some important way change the rules of the game. But there is also the productive side. What innovations or transformations do we desire, or do we feel necessary in order to say what we have to say?