Landzek has responded to my last post with a long meditation stemming from his own research, which draws on other sources and experiences than mine. I think however that we agree on two interrelated points

1) the contradiction between Laruelle’s quantum gnostic religion and his followers’ classically religious veneration of his thought.

It is clear that in the last instance Laruelle’s « Christ » is quantum thought, for Laruelle the Messiah is none other than his own philosophy. More generally Laruelle stipulates that non-standard philosophy (what I have been calling pluralism) is the Christ. In the last instance  this plural « more generally » reduces to the singular one, as Laruelle’s writing vehiculates the uniqueness hypothesis, that there is only one non-philosopher and only one non-standard philosopher, Laruelle himself.

2) the contradiction between espousal of deconstruction and the betrayal of pluralism. Laruelle attemts to radicalise deconstruction by going one step further and deconstructing what remained undeconstructed within deconstruction (in his view) by making use of a model borrowed or extrapolated from quantum physics. His « quantum deconstruction » in its own terms can not and should not be exclusive of other radicalised deconstructions, for example Badiou’s mathematical deconstructions borrowing and extrapolating from set theory and category theory. Incoherently Laruelle practices precisely this sort of unilateral exclusion as his book ANTI-BADIOU amply demonstrates. His attitude toward Deleuze and Guattari’s schizoanalytic deconstruction of Lacanianism is another example.

Landzek does not mention « immanence » explicitly in his response but I think that we agree here too:

3) Laruelle exhibits a real deficit of immanence. He claims scientific status in virtue of his unique appropriation of immanence. Yet his critique of his contemporary rivals is laid out in terms of a transcendent structure of sufficiency. Laruelle seems absolutely incapable of immanent critique, or even of recognising the real role of immanence in philosophers such as Deleuze and Badiou.

We are forced in view of Laruelle’s claims to scientific status and his inability to respect his own criteria to conclude that Laruellean non-philosophy is pseudo-science.

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  1. landzek dit :

    I like that you unabashedly say that his philosophy is just his own is just his self. Lol. I think that is so funny and in a certain sense so right.

    And you know I think that’s what I’m really coming up against. And actually that is probably why I’ve excepted the’not real’ of my own work.

    In fact that is exactly what I see Bruno Latour attempting to cope with: if all these continental philosophers I really philosophizing ultimately about themselves, yet as I say putting it in a form called theory by which they distance themselves from the actual object that they are talking about in order to have theory about it, then that means we are never really addressing the object. So I see LeTour as recognizing this and saying hey we need an opening; we need to somehow develop an opening into this theory that perpetually distance itself from the object of its reckoning.

    It may be futile, but what else have I got? Lol

    In my discussion with Dave at In the salt mine, I just realize how you and him are so precise and surgical and your approach and in your ability to turn around and talk about things, and mine is just seems in comparison such a blunt tool. From my personal perspective it feels to me that I’m trying to get so precise and clear, but with reference to you guys it’s like blunt force. Lol. But that’s why I need you guys and other people, as Plato/Socrates says, « where two go… »


  2. landzek dit :

    « …one sees before the other. »


  3. landzek dit :

    you know but on another tangent I think that’s just where the opening needs to originate. If this phenomenon that is been going on for hundreds of years has finally ended up through a traditional route to mean that everyone is just arguing a theory of oneself — i’m not sure is that what you (terrence) accept and is that the reason why you tend towards pluralism?

    But I suppose what I’m saying is there is a particular experience that manifest not as some objective world, so much as a totally inclusive meaning. I tend to disagree with the Freudian typo psychoanalytical mode that so pervades every thought that touches upon brain mental psychic tropes, where there is this standard real or healthy human mentality and then there are neurotic and psycho pathic and illusions and fantasy and all that kind of categorical psychic comparison.

    I myself am talking about a specific experience, and I think the problem is is that this particular experience that I have found or that I’ve come upon or that I’ve experienced or that I let my life through, when I go to come up for a reason for it, as a sort of exit stencil schema, and make theories about it, The theories end up meaning nothing on one and and meaning self/religion on the other.

    So I think that’s what we’re really dealing with lately the past 3040 50 years, is that even the analysis upon this strange situation has left us with an institutional duality.

    I tend to say that means that the whole theoretical platform is incorrect. And this is to say that even when we get caught in the postmoderncorrelational cycle, this too is indicative that something is wrong with the model. Because it what it’s really saying is that somehow I am attached and seven cents away to some essential stratifying true world universe: no exit.

    So I suppose that I i’m saying that Innoway we are caught in this kind of Kantian dualistic impasse. …


  4. landzek dit :

    … But I agree with Laruelle that can’t only succeeds in reifying this same incorrect route, although it might be said at times that he established it. There has to be said something about what makes sense as a kind of stratified human being, and our inability to make sense out of something that does not conform to this particular route of what’s making sense.

    But yet what icy as making sense somehow has made sense of how the route that traditionally has allowed for what makes sense does not make sense; does that make sense? I have inverted the hierarchy where the multiple comes first. I have noted that the scenario by which the world makes sense has historically been compromising itself into this other world. Traditionally and historically I see that recourse is always to this other world such that there is neurosis and depressionand mental disorders and such ‘lesser’ mental instabilities. This is to such an extent that those disorders might even be said to be due to the incorrection of the route.

    So I take what we have found thus far not as something to be argued over but is something that is true: A fact. That the human being when it argues itself into a world to justify itself against others, fines through this theorizing that there is no basis to the theory, that the foundation to this theory is ultimately suspended in a kind of faith: the transcendental clause.

    I propose that if we are to get to the truth of what a human being does then we need to set aside psychology psychoanalysis and all of our current paradigms for assessing mental disease as they are assumed to purveyed and preside over all possibility of humanity, to therefore allow an opening for people to talk about ‘World of meaning’ by which the very world comes into existence. In a very tentative way I see Philo fiction as indicating this opening. It seems to me that we have to take very small steps because of the power that is exerted in our present ‘capitalistic’ reAlity.


    • landzek dit :

      …ah.. So that’s what I’m saying is at least one fact that we have. If we have one fact then that is the basis upon which a whole science can be made. As long as we continue with what we allow for that fact to be invaded upon it to be compromised through veriest discursive ploys and situating of meaning, then we will never have a science of the sort that I’m talking about that I think that you are arguing against. Thus I say there are two routes, and that we have to an act of sort of partition. To me it is patent manifest even self evident that so long as I attempt to use a sort of Kantian intuition by which to propose truths to thereby argue with other transcendental agents about what is actually true or really true, The end result of such method that reflects upon itself is nothing on one hand and self aggrandization on the other. This is the first fact, and I have a suspicion that once we agree upon one fact that we can there by slowly begin to develop a science of the sort that we are talking about.

      Aimé par 1 personne

      • terenceblake dit :

        This is where we part company. I do not believe that such a science is possible or desirable, nor even that it makes sense.

        Aimé par 1 personne

      • landzek dit :

        Do you believe that that fact that I point out is indeed a fact?


      • landzek dit :

        … Where do you say that those two situations are just argumentative positions?


      • landzek dit :

        .. You noted that I didn’t mention anything about Larralls immanence:

        In general I would say that the use of such terms regardless of their definitional structures most often really amount to a situating of the transcendental clause.

        And this is why L puts it as a radical immanence: but it is in this radicality by which I think L is in bad faith, because he defies it’s meaning by the attempt of defining it in non-radical terms.


      • terenceblake dit :

        This is what I claim. Badiou radicalised immanence, and continues to radicalise ever further. Laruelle jumps into a supposedly « radicalised » immanence but the absoluteness of the leap and its exlusiveness of other leaps shows up its radicality as false.

        Aimé par 1 personne

      • landzek dit :

        I would say that L’s only comes up as false from a certain perspective, what I call orientation. I see B and LS dealing with the same situation. But I think that L actually puts a point on it, actually calls for what is radical in the appropriation of what he’s saying. B spells out the situation and an excellent fashion, and actually I would say that be probably spells it out and it’s real situation where L actually calls for the move to be made. The problem with L’s followers so to speak is that they feel the move has to do with some sort of spirituality or some sort of religious appropriation of terms, some sort of dogmatic view.

        But I think the significance of L is actually in that he can be found as I say to be in bad faith. Because then we must , ask what is faith? And if we can find an answer to what this faith is then we might be able to understand what I mean when I say Laraleas in bad faith.

        Indeed I do follow from Sarte’s lead, but actually the comments over on my earlier post with Dave I think we get into really good Exchange that indicates the situation at hand as it has to do with faith.


      • landzek dit :

        – I was just reading 3 pound brain’s latest post about the interpretability of ai. And I came to some thoughts about what we’re talking about here: One of the issues is that I’m no longer talking about what being is; for the most part, The ontological question is the real variability, it is what it argues in the negotiation by real agents. For me that question and solved: I call it reality. What reality actually is occurs everywhere at all times, at whatever theoretical junctures.

        I am proposing as I think Latour and I can’t think of the other names at this moment, that we look at what’s occurring in these ontological proposals. Yet we can’t really get anywhere in looking at ontological programs until we realize that the ontological philosophy that has ended as an either or situation that it began with, is evidence of one ontological situation and not a ubiquitous Omni present situation.

        If one thinks of childhood and compared to the adult; The child thinks in absolutes, The adult in relationships. To say that there is one ontological discourse that covers all of reality is an absolute postulate.
        I Kierkegaard says; in the olden days the mothers use the blacken their breasts when it was time to wean their children. It might be difficult and painful to wean ourselves from our transcendental primacy, from the heart of divine childhood.


      • landzek dit :

        … But from another standpoint I don’t think this will ever happen. Reality will always be reality. Hence the reason why I suggest a partition.


  5. Ping : Truth & Actuality (01) – dwmasten

  6. Ping : ON THE DANGERS OF SELF-CLONING: overcoming Laruelle’s scientism | AGENT SWARM

  7. Carl Looper dit :

    Facts are neither true nor false, or alternatively we could say they are both (cancelling out both terms). Or they present themselves without any concern for what conclusions might be drawn. Facts will be that which are open to any theory. Or if not, we will peel back any attached theories in order to get back to the facts. To start again. With the facts. « The sky is blue » we might say, and this we can call a fact – not because it is fundamentally true that the sky is blue (for in a particular case it might very well be closer to red, as it is at sunset, or sunrise) but because we have disentangled the fact (distilled it) from questions such as why (or how) it might be blue (or red). The fact itself (whatever it is) is not at issue. Or if it is, then we will first resolve such. Clear up the problem. Are we talking about blue skies or red skies? Sometimes, of course, the facts are the issue. Or rather, the issue is: are they the facts? For without the facts what would we be theorising? To what end would be a theory for why/how the sky is red, if the sky happens to be blue? Or we might increase the scope of the theorisation to include such a multiplication of facts: the sky during the day, the night and anywhere between. To allow for a change in facts. To accommodate such. Such a theory becomes useful in the sense we can use it at any time of day rather than searching through our bag for that which is applicable to whatever happens to be the case. The equation between facts and truth is only for the purposes of establishing the facts. It’s not for the purpose of establishing the truth. We ask of the facts that they be facts rather than a fudge. Or in theory we can just assume the facts are not a fudge. So the theory might take the form: if A then B, else if C, then D. Whichever is the fact (A or C) then this is the theory (B or D).


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