ONTOLOGICAL PLURALISM: not an ontology and more than a pluralism

Zizek’s critique of object-oriented ontology is part of a more general project, which invites comparison with Laruelle’s expanded non-philosophical project. It involves critiquing and replacing our standard forms of ontology with something related but different that both Zizek and Laruelle call “non-standard” ontology.

Convergent with Zizek’s and Laruelle’s analyses and arguments I myself have proposed a critique of standard, or “synchronic” ontologies and the preliminary characterisation of a non-standard, or “diachronic” ontology.

(For a summary and link to the full paper IS ONTOLOGY MAKING US STUPID? https://t.co/oALmX142YN.)

This text contains the first sketch of an attempt to characterise the sort of non-standard ontology that I wish to develop. In this article I make use of the single term “diachronic” to designate an alternative to standard or classical ontologies, whereas today I prefer to spell this alternative out in terms of a cluster of traits: pluralistic, heuristic, realist, open, diachronic, empirical, apophatic, and democratic.

See for example: https://terenceblake.wordpress.com/2016/02/02/feyerabends-ontology-pluralist-diachronic-apophatic-empirical-and-democratic/

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5 Responses to ONTOLOGICAL PLURALISM: not an ontology and more than a pluralism

  1. landzek says:

    Seems very similar to what im saying, but using ‘teleology’ for ‘synchronic’, and ‘ontology’ for ‘diachronic’. And, i might add, i say that ‘niether reduces to the other; one is not more true than the other’. Also i refer to a ‘cloudy’ arena of philosophy becuase a distinction between these two ‘philosophies’ is not made clear, what is being put tonuse where. As you say similarly it appears is a problem, prefeencing one over the other as a ‘better than’ or ‘more true’. 👍🏽


  2. landzek says:

    … actually upon reading into your essay a little bit perhaps it’s not very similar. But it does have similar qualities. What I mean by teleological appears to not question Being, and Innoway it is similar to what you’re saying there. But I think I go a step further: The reason why I depart from even the use of ontology as a name or initial descriptor, it’s not so much that being is given or can’t be looked into. It is more that it’s already been investigated and what we found is sufficient as a method or as a kind of scaffolding by which we then proceed to place other terms under the heading of being for any moment. The only new things we can say about being now is through replacing terms with other terms. It’s like I talk about a rose and all its aspects and how it’s distinguish from A daisy, and I say this is one situation of being. And then in another moment I talk about the flowers with red petals as opposed to the flowers with yellow petals, and I call this a different situation of being. And then in another moment I say flower A as opposed to flower B and I call that a different moment of being– The difference in being of the three cases are only in the different uses of terms, but indeed there is a manner by which we associate different moments and different realities with the terms that coalesce into Different situations in different moments.

    I think the difference between what you’re calling synchronic. And my teleological, is that yours indicates a kind of refusal talk about it or engage with it, where is I am saying it’s already been engaged to such an extent that we’ve already defined it we’ve already explored everything there is about being.


  3. landzek says:

    … such that now we can talk about other things and engage with being with these new things. That if we can admit that being has been discovered with all its angles, then we can actually somehow gain an opening into finding out how being actually manifest reality is in various manners, which is to say as opposed to one manner , for example like Dasien.


  4. landzek says:

    Yes. There are two irreconcilable routes upon objects, segreagte discourses that cannot reduce, or be explained accross arenas to ‘prove’ one to the other or that one is more true than the other.

    I think that the course of philosophy should be for an essay or addressing of a situation todistinguish itself as to which field is being addressed.

    I think it is the perpetual cloudiness involved in the distinction between these two philosophical arenas that causes a perpetuation, a redundancy, a reiteration, a constant and repetitive going over of the same issues but in different terms.

    But likewise I would say the philosophy that sees the various terms as identifying new things is one arena unto itself that cannot be proven to be wrong. And simile the arena that sees the terms as merely the same objects under different terms cannot prove itself to the former Rita, and so should be left to its own area of expertise.

    In this way we will actually be more productive in philosophy, i think.


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