objects cannot be reduced to anything else, and must be addressed by philosophy on their own terms (THE QUADRUPLE OBJECT, 138)
Objects are irreducible, and as such are the source of intelligibility for everything that exists:
the tensions between objects and their qualities and other objects can be used to account for anything else that exists (THE QUADRUPLE OBJECT, 138)
Harman’s “third table” is the meso-object, “deeper” than the scientific, the humanistic, and the common sense table because it is shorn of all sensible and knowable predicates. Completely untestable the hypothesis of the primacy of the meso-object is without any explanatory power.
For details see my review of THE THIRD TABLE here: https://www.academia.edu/1572436/HARMANS_THIRD_TABLE, and its sequel explicating some positions with more explanatory power (Latour, Laruelle, Feyerabend) here: https://www.academia.edu/7290442/HARMANS_THIRD_TABLE_II_comparison_with_Latour_and_Laruelle.
Everything reduces to objects, but
I like it. Itself a ‘middle’ that rejects all positions, routing any proposal into its space back into the predicate of its own ontologyZ.
Would you agree with that statement about Meso-objects?