My theoretical work is organised around two heuristic hypotheses:
1) contemporary Continental Philosophies can usefully be viewed as metaphysical research programmes in Karl Popper’s sense
2) within the domain of contemporary Continental Philosophy a reconceptualisation of pluralism as ontological realism is taking place.
From this perspective I examine François Laruelle’s « non-philosophy » and « non-standard philosophy » as metaphysical research programmes.
I analyse their failure to live up to their own criteria and evaluate them in terms of a set of pragmatic meta-ontological criteria.
The conclusion of this analysis is that while Laruelle correctly identifies the « vice » of philosophical sufficiency he is unable to propose a fully-developped virtuous alternative.
In view of his repeated claims to scientific status for non-philosophy and in view of his inability to respect his own criteria we must conclude that Laruelle’s non-philosophy is pseudo-science.