WHAT UNIQUENESS HYPOTHESIS?: Laruelle and the beautiful soul

Some people have questioned the presence of a uniqueness hypothesis in Laruelle’s work or had trouble with the structure of my argument.

This hypothesis can be reconstructed from the logical syntax of Laruelle’s writing. It states that Laruelle is the first and only non-philosopher (faithful disciples excluded, with Laruelle as judge of who is or is not a faithful disciple).

Laruelle endorses the uniqueness hypothesis all the time: he does not state it explicitly , he just analyses all philosophy as submitted to the principle of philosophical sufficiency, including Deleuze, Derrida, and Badiou.

Given Laruelle’s pretention to scientific status, we are entitled to formulate this implicit presupposition as an explicit hypothesis and to put it to the test against the available evidence.

Zizek and Feyerabend, but also as I have argued in the past Latour, Stiegler, Deleuze and even Badiou are falsifying instances.

Conclusion: Laruelle is doing badly what others have done or are doing better.

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3 commentaires pour WHAT UNIQUENESS HYPOTHESIS?: Laruelle and the beautiful soul

  1. landzek dit :

    Yes. Lol. I like how Zizek sometimes formulates questions of authors if they are able to understand their own proposals.

    I would submit, though, that when we consider Derrida and others and what they’re really saying about the text, we might consider that L is actually errecting or otherwise presenting us with an opportunity where an occasion by which the difference between the reader the text and the author collapses. …


  2. landzek dit :

    … I understand about what you’re saying, for sure. And I agree with you along a certain manner of appropriating things of the world.

    But I think the issue that he brings up is significant: whether such a collapse occurs, or whether the collapse never occurs and the author remains just an instigator of text toward the reader.

    It appears to me that his discourses are indeed of “the last instance” of philosophy. It is no surprise nor mirror coincidence that he writes about Christ or at least involves Christ in his ponderings in proposals. The arrogance that it appears he might in body is actually removed when we see that he is involved in a program that, rather than transcending the situation, as if there something uniquely special about him, but is rather eminence behaving imminently. which is to say for the encounter upon his text.

    For what is Eminence behaving eminently?(sp). Is it merely any sort of meaning that occurs upon reading a term that occurs in the central brain of an individual subject? Or could it be the actual occasion unmediated of the occurrence of the situation that is going on in that very moment that excludes any possibility of “otherness“ except that as much as this otherness is required to situate the occasion in a context of reason.

    Think of what idempotence means in the actual application of its meaning over its definition or meaning.

    If I push the button of the crosswalk over and over and over again eight years of the same sign


    • landzek dit :

      .. oh my God AutoCorrect and voice dictation is so ridiculous…

      Anyways; what I’m describing would explain why some people are “congregants“ as I term it. Because they are maintaining a meaning of the text as Epix coming from outside, is if it’s coming from transcendence, from some source that is not them reading it, or the special occasion of their centrality in countering something that is beyond them in an eminent manner.

      But also in a similar light it would explain L kind of over determination of his position: The overdetermination is coming from a particular manner of coming upon his text. The only way that it might be coming from him is if I automatically include the meaning of this text as something that is distant or something that is coming from someplace other than my reading of it.

      This is why I say there are two routes.

      Badiou And others would want to maintain and assert this one particular route of otherness in which they are included.

      L actually makes the heroic leap to be it’s kind of opposite, it’s kind of mirror image.

      Both of them make the mistake of reducing to one basic truth over the other.

      I might be tooting my own horn but I think the significant issue is that there is no reduction to one or the other, but that both situations occur through suspension, like the end of the rainbow maybe. It is only when we try to grab the pot of gold at the one end of the rainbow that we arrive there and find that art and that we’ve arrived at has disappeared and then we try to travel to the other end of the rainbow looking for the pot of gold.


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