1) It is laughable that so many people blindly repeat Laruelle’s claim that Gilles Deleuze’s philosophy is a « philosophy of difference ». It is much more accurately characterised as a « philosophy of multiplicity », that mutates in WHAT IS PHILOSOPHY? into a philosophy of infinity.
2) Laruelle has shown that he is capable of self criticism, but he is much slower in this than his contemporaries, and he lags behind them (his long-lasting scientism is a case in point). He is also blind to the self-criticism embodied in the work of others.
3) A notable case of this concept-blindness is to be seen in his persistence in criticising the « philosophies of difference », when the thinkers involved had already noticed the problem and moved on years before Laruelle got round to his critique.
4) A striking example is Deleuze’s passage from DIFFERENCE AND REPETITION (which features the concept of difference, but closely tied to multiplicity) to LOGIC OF SENSE, where the concept of difference is marginal, and multiplicity comes to even greater prominence).
5) Laruelle’s ideas are becoming increasingly irrelevant. His critiques of Deleuze are of relatively minor interest. Zizek, Badiou and Latour have produced deeper and more thorough responses to Deleuze’s work, and their own work has been in constant evolution.
6) One would not guess these sorts of evolution exist from Laruelle’s texts. So Iwe must reject the undue simplification of philosophical history effectuated in Laruelle’s grand narrative, where he takes pride of place (quite unjustly).
7) Laruelle promises far more than he delivers, he misses the mark far too often, and it serves no good purpose, unless wilful ignorance is a good purpose, to pretend otherwise.