1) Correlationism is a pseudo-problem. It observes the occurrence of communicative closure and proceeds to absolutise it. We are each enclosed in our « correlationist » sphere and cannot get out.
2) This is picture-thinking, and underlying it is the problem of incommensurability, a semantic notion rather than a pragmatic one. It chooses to ignore that communicative closure is never total, it is always partial, relative, and porous.
3) Correlationism belongs to what Althusser called the « problematic of the subject » and it is dissipated when we no longer conceive knowledge as a subject-object relation but as a material one of production (writing, instruments) and exchange.
4) On this conception the correlationist circle may begin to form, but it can never close.
5) The critique of correlation between subject and object as providing an adequate image of knowledge can be traced back to Karl Popper and his idea of a third world of objective knowledge.
6) The recent critiques of « correlationism » are themselves situated within pre-Popperian representationalism.
7) Bernard Stiegler has recently begun citing Popper’s theorisation of exo-somatisation as a conception of knowledge opposed to that of representation.