1) Correlationism is a pseudo-problem. It observes the occurrence of communicative closure and proceeds to absolutise it. We are each enclosed in our « correlationist » sphere and cannot get out.
2) This is picture-thinking, and underlying it is the problem of incommensurability, a semantic notion rather than a pragmatic one. It chooses to ignore that communicative closure is never total, it is always partial, relative, and porous.
3) Correlationism belongs to what Althusser called the « problematic of the subject » and it is dissipated when we no longer conceive knowledge as a subject-object relation but as a material one of production (writing, instruments) and exchange.
4) On this conception the correlationist circle may begin to form, but it can never close.
See: UNDER CORRELATIONISM, INCOMMENSURABILITY
5) The critique of correlation between subject and object as providing an adequate image of knowledge can be traced back to Karl Popper and his idea of a third world of objective knowledge.
6) The recent critiques of « correlationism » are themselves situated within pre-Popperian representationalism.
7) Bernard Stiegler has recently begun citing Popper’s theorisation of exo-somatisation as a conception of knowledge opposed to that of representation.