I am re-reading ANTI-OEDIPUS, and I have always regretted that their major examples of the « schizo-process » were either « pathological » ones: Schreber, Artaud, Nietzsche, or writers and artists. The example of Jung’s life, visions, and theories would have been both telling and more challenging.
It would also have been more honest, as there is a strong but subterranean presence of Jung in Deleuze’s work from the beginning to the end, more explicit in the earlier work on Nietzsche, more implicit or esoteric in the later works, especially those written with Guattari. One can cite the presence of the Anima in Deleuze’s discussion of Ariadne in Nietzsche’s work, and the presence of the Self in Deleuze’s discussion of Foucault.
Deleuze’s explicit mentions of Jung in ANTI-OEDIPUS and after are disappointing, and I think that Deleuze effectuated the same sort of critical transvaluation that one can see at work in the post-Jungian waves.
In particular we can identify
1) the move from an ontology of libidinal assemblages (complexes) to an ontology of images (Deleuze CINEMA I &II, James Hillman Revisioning Psychology)
2) the move from the image to an ontology of the concept (Deleuze FOUCAULT and WHAT IS PHILOSOPHY?, Wolfgang Giegerich THE SOUL’S LOGICAL LIFE).
Note: I have indicated some terminological and conceptual/imaginal influences of Jung on Deleuze here:
We do not need to find a one-to-one correspondence between Deleuze’s and Jung’s ideas to observe a generic convergence. The two systems are very different, in part due to their different points of departure, but they converge on the ontology of image, and this convergence is even more pronounced when we take into account the post-Jungian ideas of James Hillman.
Hillman’s point of departure is Jung’s statement « psyche is image ». Hillman uses this insight to deconstruct the theological and biological dogmas of Jungianism. Deleuze’s point of departure in the Cinema books is Bergson’s matter is image (movement-image and time-image).
Deleuze in his seminar on the cinema explicitly stated that his taxonomy of images can be applied to people also, to situate them in the type of worlds they inhabit.
More convergences, beneath the strategy of allusive reprises, can be found here: https://terenceblake.wordpress.com/2018/09/09/jung-deleuze-3-re-naming-purging-and-imaging/
A problem exists in comprehending the status of the archetypal image in Jung. It is true that Jung’s images are seen under the regime of « universality ». However, even such a universalist thinker as Alain Badiou says the universality of Truths is not that of the universal quantifier. He indicates thus that a quantitative, extensional concept of universality is not the only conceivable one, and that one can envisage a « qualitative » universality, one that is trans-temporal and trans-spatial without necessarily being omni-temporal and/or omni-spatial.
This qualitative concept of universality brings the notion very close to Gilles Deleuze’s concept of the « untimely ». Deleuze, when he is writing with Felix Guattari, like many others, persists in seeing Jung’s archetypes as « mythological entities », understood in a fixist way. This is not the only perspective in which to interpret them, as it is equally possible to see them in Deleuze’s own terms as « daimones », or mutable becomings of indeterminate place and of multiple connexions. This concept of more than personal psychic images is shared by both Deleuze and Hillman.