Abundance vs Withdrawal: The real does not withdraw, it abounds

It is not so easy to escape reductionism as one might think. Aside from the intellectual blunder of not perceiving or not being able to think with incommensurable gaps of meaning, there is also the ethical blunder of re-instating transcendence with the same gesture that intends to abolish it. For instance, I think that Meillassoux re-instates an absolute (of contingence) and thus falls back into onto-theology. NO BORDERS METAPHYSICS has some interesting things to say about this, including a critique of his absolutisation of modality:
http://anarchai.blogspot.fr/2012/05/dismantling-absolute-contingency.html
I try to push the analysis a little further here:
https://terenceblake.wordpress.com/2012/05/13/meillassouxs-onto-theology-of-contingency/
and in summary form here:
https://terenceblake.wordpress.com/2012/05/13/rorty-in-my-dreams-1-bogus-ontology-is-just-bad-epistemology/

We must distinguish here Meillassoux’s meta-theoretical proclamations about « going outside » and the actual functioning of his theory, which absolutises contingency. Bensusan argues that contingency is always relative to something else and so proposes a space of contingencies that is generated by the pluralities of objects or of Whitehead’s actual entities « because they happen to be plural ».

I find Bensusan’s explication of Whitehead’s concept of the extensive continuum in terms of a space of contingencies much more satisfying. I think Bensusan’s analysis points to the idea that the space of contingencies is a space of abundance and not of withdrawal. That this space is built out of the pluralities (Deleuze would say out of multiplicities) makes it resemble Deleuze’s notion of smooth space. This makes me wonder about the thesis that contingence is always contingence relative to something else. This seems to be a necessary proviso if we are to avoid an onto-theology of contingence (which I argue that Meillassoux falls into). Yet I am haunted by Deleuze’s idea that resistance, or deterritorialisation comes first. Bensusan seems to agree here by stating that pluralities come first, before space (I suppose this is a logical « before »). Even deconstruction maintains that it can be a necessary preliminary move to privilege one term of a binary couple, the marginal resisting term. Deleuze and, I would argue, Feyerabend seem to maintain that we must give precedence to the term bearing the most plurality. In which case contingence would be partially relative in our crystallised states, but somehow absolute in the decrystallised continuum. I further like his idea that a criterion of demarcation for evaluating the relative merits of such pluralist doctrines is in the degree of contact or interaction they authorise. Pluralism for me is on the side of abundance and interaction, as opposed to monist doctrines of withdrawal and retreat from contact.