My hypothesis is that just as James Hillman tried to resolve Jung’s conceptual/theoretical insufficiencies (scientism, biologism, abstract universalism, dualist metaphysics, binary oppositions) by means of his « archetypal » turn Deleuze responded to those same inadequacies by a « structuralist » turn.
Deleuze’s « Lacanism » in DIFFERENCE AND REPETITION and LOGIC OF SENSE was an experiment in trying to preserve Jung’s insights by shedding their dogmatic shell. This solution proved unsatisfactory, and Deleuze quickly abandoned it.
Deleuze’s turn to Guattari was in essence a return to himself. Unfortunately, Guattari had been more Lacanised than Deleuze before rejecting Lacan’s theoretical apparatus. Hence the ambivalent pronouncement’s about Jung ( favourable and unfavourable) in the D&G collaborations.
Despite the ambivalence of their pronouncements about Jung, the use of the Jungian conceptual apparatus continues through the D&G collaborations, except that it has been renamed, purged of biologistic and metaphysical elements. Notably, « Anima » is called « becoming-woman », the Self is called « body without organs », and the Shadow is often referenced as such.
Beneath the level of explicit pronouncements (D&G’s ambivalence about Jung) and the conceptual apparatus (Jungian concepts re-named and purged), there is the imagistic level, which is pure Jungian-Hillmanian imaginative theorising.
This imaginal level becomes even more explicit and emancipated, to be explored for itself, in Deleuze’s cinema books, CINEMA I & II, where an image-ontology is proposed and implemented, with no relation to Freudian or Lacanian concepts and symbols.
The Lacanian « codes » of the imaginary and the symbolic are avoided as overly reductive « slowing down » of Jungian concepts. The plane of immanence of the image (the imaginal plane) is far vaster than a supposedly inherently binary « imaginary ». Jung’s « symbolic » life pluralises Lacan’s notion of the symbolic. These deconstructions are already implicit in the concepts of becoming-animal, becoming-woman, becoming-molecule (Alchemy!) in A THOUSAND PLATEAUS.
Translations that are not sensitive to this Jungian resonance misrepresent the text, e.g. in English we have:
« This is the central chamber, which one need no longer fear is empty since one fills it with oneself » (Deleuze, FOUCAULT, page 123).
In French the last part reads: « puisqu’on y met le· soi »: « since one fills it with the self ». In the translation the concept of « le soi » « the self » has been omitted in favour of the less Jungianly connoted « oneself ».
In the FOUCAULT book the re-naming continues, e.g. Jung’s « process of individuation » (realisation of the Self) becomes the process of subjectivation. The link between the two concepts (individuation/subjectivation) can be seen in a note:
« The question would be: is there a Self or a process of subjectivation in Oriental techniques » (FOUCAULT, 148).
Deleuze’s FOUCAULT is the great book on the Self, there are multiple references to it on almost every page in the second half of the book (the self, techniques of the self, relation to self.
This omnipresence of the concept of « self » is a little obscured in the English translation, which translates « rapport à soi » (literally: relation to self) as « relation to oneself ». This rendition is linguistically correct, but conceptually unfortunate. A whole continent of Deleuze/Jung convergences is partially submerged and needs to raised again.